DM Consunji vs CA Case Digest

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G.R. No. 137873, April 20 2001

Justice Kapunan

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

ISSUE: Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil Code pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed.

Co vs Court of Appeals Case Digest

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G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

Chief Justice Narvasa

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

People vs Bitdu Case Digest

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G.R. No. L-38230, November 21, 1933

Justice Vickers

FACTS: Mora Bitdu was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan of this Province of Zamboanga in accordance with Mohammedan rites more than twelve years ago, and that about seven months ago she was also married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in accordance with Mohammedan customs. She claims, however, that the second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place after she had been divorced from her first husband Halid in accordance with Mohammedan customs, said divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino Cuevas, of Isabela de Basilan.

ISSUE: whether the divorce of the marriage is valid in accordance with the Philippine laws

HELD: No. A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.

Delgado vs Alonso Case Digest

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G.R. No. L-19826, March 31, 1923

Justice Street

FACTS: In November of the year 1917 Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the municipality of Goa from one Stickney. On February 1, 1918, Alonso conveyed the same property to Luciano Delgado; and in order to secure the payment of the purchase money Delgado contemporaneously executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant upon the same land and also upon two other large parcels already owned by the plaintiff situated in the municipality of Tinambac, of the Province of Camarines Sur.

A simple calculation shows that the interest agreed to be paid upon the purchase price of the land which had thus been bought by Delgado was at a rate well above fifteen per centum per annum. This mortgage therefore offends against the provisions of the Usury Law, which limits the rate that can ordinarily be secured by mortgage upon real property to twelve per centum per annum (Act No. 2655-2).

Delgado filed a complaint against Alonso to recover the sum of P2,625 paid upon February 1, 1919, by way of interest. To this complaint the defendant answered with a general denial; and by way of special defense he alleged that the contract in question had been entered into by him innocently and in total ignorance on his part of the existence of the Usury Law and, further, that he had been maliciously inveigled into said contract by the plaintiff, with full knowledge on the part of the latter of the illegality of the stipulation for usurious interest, and with the design of taking advantages of the Usury Law to the prejudice of the defendant.

ISSUE: whether the defendant is justified in raising ignorance of the usury law as defense to escape its legal consequences.

HELD: No. Both parties were, in our opinion, victims, at once of their own ignorance and of economic practices inherited from the past; and ignorance of the provisions of the Usuary Law does not relieve either from the legal consequences of the contract into which they voluntarily entered.

We are quite prepared to believe the defendant when he says that the entered into the contract in total ignorance of the law against usury and it is not improbable that the plaintiff, stimulated by the desire to purchase the property, had suggested the terms upon which he was willing to take it; but it is not proved that he had the Usury Law in mind at the time or maliciously intended to entrap the defendant into the making of this contract and then to take advantage of the law.

Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Judge Angeles Case Digest

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G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996

Justice Torres Jr.

FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued  Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they executed respective undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the private respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.

The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the ground that it was not published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. . . .

The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

Pesigan vs Judge Angeles Case Digest

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G.r. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984

Justice Aquino

FACTS: Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.

Inspite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was based on Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos"

At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another.

ISSUE: Whether the executive order is enforceable even before its publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD: No. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.

People vs Que Po Lay Case Digest

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G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

Justice Montemayor

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951.

Tanada vs Tuvera Case Digest

G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Justice Escolin 

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE: whether the laws which provide for their own effectivity dates require publication in the Official gazette or Newspaper of General Circulation.

HELD: Yes. Art. 2. Of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. However, It does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

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