DM Consunji vs CA Case Digest

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G.R. No. 137873, April 20 2001

Justice Kapunan

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

ISSUE: Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil Code pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed.

Co vs Court of Appeals Case Digest

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G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

Chief Justice Narvasa

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

People vs Bitdu Case Digest

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G.R. No. L-38230, November 21, 1933

Justice Vickers

FACTS: Mora Bitdu was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan of this Province of Zamboanga in accordance with Mohammedan rites more than twelve years ago, and that about seven months ago she was also married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in accordance with Mohammedan customs. She claims, however, that the second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place after she had been divorced from her first husband Halid in accordance with Mohammedan customs, said divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino Cuevas, of Isabela de Basilan.

ISSUE: whether the divorce of the marriage is valid in accordance with the Philippine laws

HELD: No. A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.

Delgado vs Alonso Case Digest

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G.R. No. L-19826, March 31, 1923

Justice Street

FACTS: In November of the year 1917 Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the municipality of Goa from one Stickney. On February 1, 1918, Alonso conveyed the same property to Luciano Delgado; and in order to secure the payment of the purchase money Delgado contemporaneously executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant upon the same land and also upon two other large parcels already owned by the plaintiff situated in the municipality of Tinambac, of the Province of Camarines Sur.

A simple calculation shows that the interest agreed to be paid upon the purchase price of the land which had thus been bought by Delgado was at a rate well above fifteen per centum per annum. This mortgage therefore offends against the provisions of the Usury Law, which limits the rate that can ordinarily be secured by mortgage upon real property to twelve per centum per annum (Act No. 2655-2).

Delgado filed a complaint against Alonso to recover the sum of P2,625 paid upon February 1, 1919, by way of interest. To this complaint the defendant answered with a general denial; and by way of special defense he alleged that the contract in question had been entered into by him innocently and in total ignorance on his part of the existence of the Usury Law and, further, that he had been maliciously inveigled into said contract by the plaintiff, with full knowledge on the part of the latter of the illegality of the stipulation for usurious interest, and with the design of taking advantages of the Usury Law to the prejudice of the defendant.

ISSUE: whether the defendant is justified in raising ignorance of the usury law as defense to escape its legal consequences.

HELD: No. Both parties were, in our opinion, victims, at once of their own ignorance and of economic practices inherited from the past; and ignorance of the provisions of the Usuary Law does not relieve either from the legal consequences of the contract into which they voluntarily entered.

We are quite prepared to believe the defendant when he says that the entered into the contract in total ignorance of the law against usury and it is not improbable that the plaintiff, stimulated by the desire to purchase the property, had suggested the terms upon which he was willing to take it; but it is not proved that he had the Usury Law in mind at the time or maliciously intended to entrap the defendant into the making of this contract and then to take advantage of the law.